Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
WebWe study the simplest form of two-sided markets: one seller, one buyer and a single item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient mechanism for this problem that … WebMay 1, 2024 · [Show full abstract] bilateral trade application, that this is not a general implication. Bilateral trade is ex post efficient under level-k implementation while it is …
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
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WebWe introduce naive traders in bilateral trading. These traders report their true types in direct mechanisms and bid/ask their values/costs in auctions. We show that by expropriating naive traders in direct mechanisms, the mechanism designer can subsidize additional trades by strategic traders and improve efficiency ex-post compared to when
WebApr 17, 2016 · The mechanism selects one of the two alternatives uniformly at random, and then runs a 2-approximate DSIC, SBB, IR mechanism for the bilateral trade setting (i.e., the setting with one buyer,... WebMyerson and Satterthwaite, "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," JET 1983 In many bilateral bargaining situations with asymmetric information, ex post efficiency is inconsistent with incen-tive compatibility and individual rationality. One can compute the highest expected surplus consistent with IC and IR. If the equilibrium to a ...
WebDec 18, 2024 · Specifically, given the prominence of linear contracts, we consider linear contracts in bilateral trading environments and characterize the range of possible mechanisms which satisfy ex-post efficiency, incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance. WebMar 21, 2024 · In a bilateral bargaining problem with private values, Hagerty and Rogerson (J Econ Theory 42(1):94–107, 1987) showed that essentially all dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex post individually rational, and budget balanced mechanisms are posted-price mechanisms, where a price is drawn from a distribution, and trade occurs if both …
WebJun 1, 1987 · (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading 2024, Games and Economic Behavior Show abstract Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices 2024, Journal of Economic Theory Citation Excerpt : In their model, a seller and a buyer with quasilinear preferences trade a single indivisible good.
WebDownloadable (with restrictions)! This paper revisits Myerson and Satterthwaite's (1983) classic analysis of mechanism design for bilateral trading, replacing equilibrium with a level-k model of strategic thinking and focusing on direct mechanisms. The revelation principle fails for level-k models, so restricting attention to direct mechanisms and … can lvh be feltWebCreated Date: 2/14/2005 1:41:49 PM can lvh cause anginaWebOct 24, 2024 · Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of Economic Theory 1983;29(2):265–281. Article MathSciNet Google Scholar Ogston E, Vassiliadis S. A peer-to-peer agent auction. Proceedings of the first international joint conference on autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1, pp 151–159; 2002. Pecan street dataport. www ... fix default speakers windows 10WebApr 17, 2016 · We study the bilateral trade problem: one seller, one buyer and a single, indivisible item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient and incentive … can lvl beam be used outdoorsWebMay 1, 2024 · 1. Introduction. This paper revisits Myerson and Satterthwaite 's (1983; “MS”) classic analysis of mechanism design for bilateral trading with independent private … can luxury suv tow a trailerWebclassic analysis of the design of incentive-efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading with independent private values, inspired by Chatterjee and Samuelson’s 1983 OR (“CS”) positive analysis. MS assumed that traders will play any desired Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the game created by the chosen mechanism. fix dehya genshinWebCS’s equilibrium analysis of bilateral trading via double auction CS’s model has a potential seller and buyer of an indivisible object, in exchange for money. Their von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are quasilinear in money: risk-neutral, with money values for the object. 23 CS’s equilibrium analysis of bilateral trading via double can lvh cause st elevation